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Achieving Net Zero Emissions
Requires the Knowledge and Skills of
the Oil and Gas Industry
Astley Hastings* and Pete Smith
Institute of Biological and Environmental Science, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, United Kingdom
The challenge facing society in the 21st century is to improve the quality of life
for all citizens in an egalitarian way, providing sufficient food, shelter, energy, and
other resources for a healthy meaningful life, while at the same time decarbonizing
anthropogenic activity to provide a safe global climate, limiting temperature rise to well-
below 2◦C with the aim of limiting the temperature increase to no more than 1.5◦C. To
do this, the world must achieve net zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2050.
Currently spreading wealth and health across the globe is dependent on growing the
GDP of all countries, driven by the use of energy, which until recently has mostly been
derived from fossil fuel. Recently, some countries have decoupled their GDP growth and
greenhouse gas emissions through a rapid increase in low carbon energy generation.
Considering the current level of energy consumption and projected implementation rates
of low carbon energy production, a considerable quantity of fossil fuels is projected to
be used to fill the gap, and to avoid emissions of GHG and close the gap between
the 1.5◦C carbon budget and projected emissions, carbon capture and storage (CCS)
on an industrial scale will be required. In addition, the IPCC estimate that large-scale
GHG removal from the atmosphere is required to limit warming to below 2◦C using
technologies such as Bioenergy CCS and direct carbon capture with CCS to achieve
climate safety. In this paper, we estimate the amount of carbon dioxide that will have
to be captured and stored, the storage volume, technology, and infrastructure required
to achieve the energy consumption projections with net zero GHG emissions by 2050.
We conclude that the oil and gas production industry alone has the geological and
engineering expertise and global reach to find the geological storage structures and
build the facilities, pipelines, and wells required. Here, we consider why and how oil and
gas companies will need to morph from hydrocarbon production enterprises into net
zero emission energy and carbon dioxide storage enterprises, decommission facilities
only after CCS, and thus be economically sustainable businesses in the long term, by
diversifying in and developing this new industry.
Keywords: CCS, carbon capture and storage, oil and gas industry (O&G), skills, market size and growth, negative
emissions, grenhouse gas removal
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INTRODUCTION
A Net Zero World
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) Paris meeting in 2015 resulted in the Paris
Agreement where 195 signatory nations agreed to undertake
ambitious efforts to combat climate change in order to limit
global warming to below 2◦C with further ambitions to reduce
this limit to well-below 2◦C above preindustrial averages
(UNFCCC, 2016). As global temperature is proportional to
atmospheric greenhouse gas (GHG) concentration (CO2, CH4,
N2O, fluorocarbons, etc.) and their half-life in the atmosphere
varies from decades to centuries, the world has a limited
GHG budget to emit into the atmosphere before the 2◦C limit
is breached. The IPCC “Global Warming of 1.5◦C” report
indicated that cumulative net anthropogenic GHG emissions
postindustrialization should not exceed an ∼3 trillion tons CO2
equivalent (Tt CO2 eq.) carbon budget (CB) to avoid breaching
the 1.5◦C warming threshold (Rogelj et al., 2018). This CB uses
the global warming potential (GWP∗) fromAllenM. et al. (2018).
At the end of 2017, only∼800 Gt CO2 eq. emissions remained to
reach the CB. As currently in 2019 annual anthropogenic GHG
emissions are ∼40 Gt CO2 eq./year, the world can only emit at
that rate for a further 25 years before the CB is exhausted and
emissions should be zero. However, in spite of global ambitions
to the contrary, emissions are currently projected to increase each
year making a likely overshoot on the CB. However, the recent
downturn in economic activity and life-style changes due to the
coronavirus disease 2019 (Covid-19) have resulted in a short-
term reduction in emissions in 2020 (Le Quéré et al., 2020), some
of which may become locked in by the “Green Recovery” policies
and investment but will have a minimal impact on the CB.
It is impossible to achieve zero anthropogenic emissions as
parts of food production, manufacturing, and transport cannot
be emissions free. However, as the atmosphere can be treated as
a reservoir of GHG, if these residual emissions can be balanced
by GHG removal (GGR), then we can achieve net zero emissions
(net zero). In addition, in the medium term, if net zero cannot
be achieved by the end of the CB, then further GHG can be
removed from the atmosphere to reduce atmospheric GHG
concentrations. The leading technologies for GGR are either land
based through photosynthesis and storage of carbon in the soil
and vegetation or through physical removal and storage in a
geological repository. Although changing land management to
store soil carbon and afforestation to store vegetation carbon
is effective, it has a limited capacity due to land availability
and also reaches saturation, but it is reversible. This leaves a
direct air capture (DAC) through physical and chemical devices
which exists as prototype technology but require∼2,000 kWh or
electrical and thermal energy per ton of CO2 captured (Buettler
et al., 2019) and bioenergy carbon capture and storage (BECCS).
BECCS is a combination of existing technologies and essentially
captures carbon from the atmosphere by photosynthesis, burns
the biomass for energy, and captures the resulting CO2 (Albanito
et al., 2019). Both DAC and BECCS require CO2 capture,
transport, and storage in a geological repository [carbon capture
and storage (CCS)]. In addition, decarbonization of the residual
use of fossil fuels, be they oil, gas, or coal based, for electricity,
heat, motive power, metal refining, or cement production
requires that for net zero, the CO2 emitted must be eliminated
or captured and stored if their use is to be continued in a net zero
economy (de Coninck and Revi, 2018).
Current GHG Emissions Trajectory
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fifth
Assessment Report (AR5) shows that GHG emission growth
has accelerated over the past decade despite policies to limit
emissions (Edenhofer et al., 2014; IPCC, 2014). Most growth
in emissions is driven by CO2 from fossil fuel use in the energy
and industry sectors. About half of cumulative anthropogenic
CO2 emissions between 1750 and 2010 occurred in the last
40 years (Edenhofer et al., 2014). Emissions continue to rise
with increasing economic growth and population in non-
OECD countries. This increase in emissions was paused
during the 2008 banking crisis but subsequently continued
to increase until the recent reduction caused by the Covid-19
pandemic, though this reduction is likely to be short lived
(Forster et al., 2020; Le Quéré et al., 2020). In the IPCC special
report SR1.5, several emission scenarios are tested to limit
warming ∼1.5◦C; all show that net zero emissions must be
achieved by 2050, and if a slower trajectory in reductions
is followed, then the amount of negative emissions that
are required to balance the cumulative emissions increases
(Rogelj et al., 2018).
The current annual anthropogenic GHG emissions are ∼40
Gt CO2, and the consequences of continuing this rate of
emissions is a global temperature increase exceeding the 2◦C
limit agreed to under the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change. This will significantly increase the risks
to a range of natural and human systems over this century
and beyond (IPCC, 2014). Urgent action is required to reduce
emissions to avoid dangerous climate change (Edenhofer et al.,
2014; Rogelj et al., 2018). The analysis shows that there is
still time to act, but the window of opportunity is rapidly
closing and that the longer we wait, the more costly and
risky the solutions will be (Edenhofer et al., 2014). The carbon
budget of ∼1,000 Gt CO2 remaining emissions should not
be exceeded if more than a 2◦C warming is to be avoided.
With only ∼20 years or slightly longer if the Covid-19 effect
persists, to emit GHG gas at the current rate, this carbon
budget should be used to create the infrastructure for a global
low carbon energy production system to sustain a future low
carbon economy, and it should not be squandered on supporting
business as usual.
Future Projections of Fossil Fuel Use
The current consumption of primary energy is predicted to
continue to rise [IEA (International Energy Agency), 2019; BP,
2020], and by 2040, the entire global carbon budget of carbon
dioxide emissions of ∼1,000 Gt CO2 eq. (Miller and Sorrell,
2014) allowable to give a 50:50 chance of meeting the 2◦C
target of global temperature increase will be used, and we will
still have high emissions. The IEA’s most optimistic sustainable
development scenario predicts that net zero is reached by 2070,
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which misses the 2◦C target [IEA (International Energy Agency),
2020b]. Even though the rate of increase slowed in 2019, without
negative CO2 emissions (Fuss et al., 2014), by 2040, emissions of
GHGmust be reduced to zero. However, based on the IEA-stated
policies scenario [IEA (International Energy Agency), 2020a]
which includes new measures and policies that promote energy
efficiency and low carbon technologies, the IEA projects total
energy demand will grow by 10% between 2019 and 2030, in
spite of dropping 10% in 2020 due to Covid. In this scenario,
coal demand is projected to drop from 2019−5,500 million
tons coal (Mtce) to 4,800 Mtce by 2040, oil consumption is
projected to increase from 2019 levels by 9 million barrels per
day (Mb/day) to 104 Mb/day, gas consumption will rise by
30% to 5.4 trillion cubic meters (Tcm) [liquefied natural gas
alone increases from 300 to 540 billion cubic meters (bcm)].
The BP Energy Outlook 2020 makes similar forecasts. Both
the IEA and BP scenarios based upon current policies or
governments and investment plans of brother oil and other
energy companies and utilities show that at best if policies and
investment plans do not change, GHG emissions will at best
remain at the current levels. Clearly, the IPCC objective of
reducing GHG emissions to zero is at odds with the current
IPCC, IEA, and BP projections for fossil energy use, as by
2040 emissions should have reduced to zero, instead the IEA
projects fossil fuel emissions to be 36.7 Gt CO2/year and BP
between 18 and 45, unless all the projected CO2 emissions are
geologically stored.
It is estimated that by 2040, only 15% of passenger cars
will be electric (BP, 2020), for road transport overall, biofuels
will make up 8% of road transport demand, the rest being
suppliedmainly by fossil fuels (BP, 2020). There will be a growing
percentage of electrified trains and urban transport, but air and
sea transport will remain fueled by fossil energy sources, and
their emissions will not easily be captured, representing 21.6%
of total emissions. Based on the IEA scenario, world electricity
demand is projected to rise by 80% from current consumption by
2040 to 39,000 TWh, and the share in renewables will increase
from 21% in 2012 to 33% by 2040 [IEA (International Energy
Agency), 2018]. Installed capacity for renewables is projected
to increase by 4,000 GW by 2040. This means that by 2040,
total electricity generation will be 12,937 TWh from renewables
of which 12% is bioenergy, 50% is hydro, 24% is wind, 2%
geothermal, 8% solar PV, 2% concentrated solar, and a small
amount of marine energy. Nuclear is projected to rise slightly
from 11 today to 12% by 2040. This is lower than its peak in
1996 of 18% of total electricity generation. Due to the overall
increase in electricity demand, the nuclear electricity generating
capacity is predicted in this scenario to increase from 392 GW
today to 624 GW by 2040. However, as most currently operating
nuclear power stations will need to be decommissioned by this
time, the entire 2040 capacity will be new. This leaves, by 2040,
55% of electricity generated from fossil fuel, which will result in
∼14.4 Gt of annual carbon dioxide emissions, out of the total
emissions of ∼37 Gt CO2e in the evolving transition scenario
(BP, 2020). This is greater than the 13 Gt CO2e emitted in 2010
by electricity generation.
The Potential Carbon Capture and Storage
and GGR Market
In summary, total energy demand will grow by 37% by 2040,
and taking into account energy efficiency improvements and
projected growth in non-fossil energy use due to the change
in mix of fossil and other fuels in the IEA current policy
scenario, this will cause a 20% increase in GHG emissions. If
such improvements were not accounted for, oil consumption
would be 23 Mb/d higher (+22%), gas consumption 940 bcm
(+17%), and coal consumption 920 Mtce higher (+15%). GHG
emissions are thus projected to rise by 20% by 2040, and if they
were to continue at that rate beyond 2040, the world would be
on-track for a 3.5+◦C rise in temperature. If this scenario of
fossil fuel use is realistic, then the carbon from its use should
no longer be emitted to the atmosphere if the global temperature
rise is to be limited to 2◦C. CCS involves three phases: capture
of the CO2, its transport, and its geological storage. CCS from
stationary use of energy is the most practical, and so the 55%
of fossil fuel–generated electricity and industrial processes like
metal refining and cement production should be the first targets.
The total amount of CO2 to store each year in the IEA current
policy scenario from stationary use by 2040 is 24 Gt CO2e, of
which electricity generation accounts for 15.4 Gt CO2e. However,
the total emissions from anthropogenic activity including food
production and the “difficult to eliminate” mobile emissions are
37 GT CO2e/year, which for net zero must be eliminated or
negated by negative emission using DAC, BECCS afforestation of
other land-related GGR. This forms the upper limit for the CCS
market, as shown in Figure 1.
Snøhvit in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea is a good
example of a typical CCS storage system. It uses an amine
separation system in an onshore LNG plant, a 153-km pipeline
to transport the CO2 offshore, a single horizontal well that
injects around 0.7 Mt of CO2/year into a saline aquifer, with
a total capacity of 23 Mt (Equinor, 2020). Holloway (2009)
estimates that the UK continental shelf has a storage capacity
for 25 Gt CO2, enough for 100 years of emissions from UK
power stations at current levels, which were 184 Mt/CO2 in
2015. However, this would require 260 installations similar to
Snøhvit. This is comparable with the number of oil and gas
production facilities in the UK continental Shelf. Scaling this
globally to capture all fossil emissions from electricity generation
worldwide by 2040 would need to store 15.4 Gt CO2/year by
2040 due to the projected electricity generation mix and would
thus need 20,500 of such installations [IEA (International Energy
Agency), 2013] estimates GHG emissions of 13.36 Gt CO2/year in
2012 from electricity production for comparison]. If installations
for GGR to balance emissions from transport, farming, and
industrial processes are considered in the IEA scenario of 37 GT
CO2e/year emissions, then the requirement is for 50,000 Snøhvit
installations, unless emissions can be otherwise reduced.
The Technology Readiness Level (ESA,
2008) of Carbon Capture and Storage
If fossil fuel use projections follow the IEA-defined policy
scenario, decarbonizing the 55% of electricity generation by
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FIGURE 1 | This is a graph of projected emissions to 2055. The area under the red curve is the IPCC SR1.5 low-energy demand–projected net annual emission
pathway to keep global warming below 1.5◦C, reaching net zero by 2050. The area in blue is the difference between the projected emissions from the IEA for currently
stated policy scenario and the desired net zero pathway. This is the potential CCS requirement to achieve net zero by 2050.
2040 will require a CCS industry capable of storing 15.4 Gt
CO2/year. To put this into perspective, current oil and natural
gas production quantities are 4.2 and 3.1 Gt oil equivalents/year,
respectively. CO2 when liquid has a density of 770 kg/m
3 and
a density of 1.977 kg/m3 at 1 atmosphere and 0◦C. The liquid
density is similar to oil, and gas is denser than methane at 0.716
kg/m3 under the same conditions. When CO2 is injected into
a geological formation, it can be stored in different forms, and
this depends on the pressure and temperature of the geological
formation relative to the pressure–temperature phase diagram
of carbon dioxide (Figure 2). At formation temperatures, which
are usually above 36◦C, CO2 is either a vapor below 90 bar or
a supercritical fluid above, thus the CO2, being less dense, will
rise to the top of the reservoir. However, CO2 is also soluble
in water at the rate of 1.45 g/L at 25◦C and 100 kPa, and since
water saturated with CO2 is denser, it will sink to the bottom of
the reservoir.
The concept of storing the CO2 gas in a geological formation
relies on finding a porous rock into which the CO2 can be
injected with a seal mechanism that ensures the CO2 is trapped.
The type of seal depends on the mechanism to trap the gas
in the rock formation. If it is stored as a gas, or critical fluid,
then the seal must be at the top of the reservoir; however, if
it is stored in solution, the seal must be at the bottom of the
reservoir. In practice, the storage mechanism is a combination
of both. Injecting CO2 into a geological formation will increase
the pressure, and the volume that can be injected is limited
as by the geomechanical properties of the reservoir system,
to avoid increasing the pressure to the point that it fractures
the rock that created the seal. Typically, volumes >2% of
the reservoir volume cannot be injected, unless some fluid
is taken out of the rock (produced) to reduce the pressure,
and in this case, the produced fluids have to be disposed of
without harming the environment. This means that depleted
oil and gas reservoirs can be used for storing CO2 as they
can be pressured to their original preproduction pressure. CO2
can also be used to enhance oil recovery (EOR), both as a
miscible agent, where the injected CO2 is a supercritical fluid
and dissolves in the oil causing it to swell and reduce it
viscosity—thus increasing reservoir pressure and improving its
mobility, or it can be used as an immiscible injection medium
(as a gas/vapor) to facilitate repressuring the reservoir and
gravity drainage. This is a mature technology for the oil and
gas industry and CO2 EOR is in widespread use in the USA.
Pure CO2 sequestration is less common and currently confined
to demonstration projects, but the technology of locating the
rock formation and drilling wells, construction of facilities, and
operation of the injection wells is similar to that used in the
finding and production of oil and gas. There are currently 18
CCS projects in the world and four in operation: in Salah in
Algeria, operated by Sonatrach-BP-Equinor, and Snøhvit and
Sleipner in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea operated by
Equinor (2020). The first large-scale CCS for the power sector
commenced operation in October 2014 at the Boundary Dam
coal-fired power station in Saskatchewan, Canada, selling the
CO2 for EOR. There are other projects in the planning or
construction phase indicating a technology readiness level (TRL)
level of 8 or 9.
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FIGURE 2 | Phase diagram of carbon dioxide (source: http://elements.geoscienceworld.org/content/3/3/179/F2.expansion.html).
The separation of CO2 from other gases by the amine
process is a mature technology that is used in many natural
gas-processing plants and refineries and can be adapted to
capture CO2 precombustion to produce hydrogen for the
actual combustion, or postcombustion from the exhaust gasses
(Rochelle, 2009; Fuss et al., 2014), a TRL of 9. Anhydrous CO2 in
the gas phase or as a supercritical fluid is not corrosive at surface
temperatures and can be transported using steel metallurgy but
requires special elastomers for seals. However, CO2 is corrosive
when there is water present, forming carbonic acid, and pipe
valves and pressure vessels require stainless steel metallurgy. The
TRL level of this technology is 8–9.
There are other technologies, such as calcium looping, being
developed, but these are not yet operational (Choi et al., 2009;
Astolfi et al., 2019). There are other CO2 disposal options,
involving carbonation (rather than storage in depleted oil and
gas reservoirs and saline aquifers) where leakage would not be
a problem. These are now operational at pilot scale (Matter
and Kelemen, 2009; Buettler et al., 2019). Another approach is
carbon capture and use (CCU). There are several approach being
researched such as a process to capture CO2 in brine rich in Mg
and Ca ion to form carbonates which can be used tomake cement
or as a chemical feedstock (Imbabi, private communication). This
process in being developed by the University of Aberdeen with
funding from Qatar and requires large amount of Ca- and Mg-
rich brine to combine with gaseous CO2. This is synergetic with
the oil gas industry (OGI) as it produces large quantities of brine
which for terrestrial locations creates a disposal problem, which
will also be the case where CCS used saline aquifer carbonation
for storage. Other CCU strategies such as using the CO2 to
produce fuel are being pursued; however, this is an energy-
intensive process. The TRL of these technologies is below 7.
ROLE OF THE OGI AND A POTENTIAL
BUSINESS MODEL
Having established the global need for large-scale CCS to either
decarbonize future fossil fuel use or provide sufficient negative
emissions to achieve net zero and identified that in general all of
the technologies are mostly at a TRL of TRL 8 or 9, the question
is how can this embryo industry be ramped up in a timely fashion
at scale and what policy levers are required to achieve this. In this
section, we consider the role of the oil companies and potential
business model.
The Role of the Oil Companies
The technology and skills required for CCS (except DAC
and bioenergy) are virtually identical to those employed in
the exploration, production, and processing of hydrocarbons.
The OGI employs earth scientists and reservoir engineers to
build geological models to identify potential reservoirs and to
model them statically and dynamically using well-data, cores,
petrophysical logs, and test data. Drilling engineers drill the
wells, production engineers design the well-completions, facility
engineers design processing equipment, platforms, and pipelines,
and civil engineers design transport facilities and roads, etc. In
addition, license holders require legal and financial experts to
negotiate contracts with land owners and governments. License
holders share the expertise with Integrated Service Companies
who provide most of the routine operational work.
Current experience of CCS in the Salah, Snøhvit, and Sleipner
CCS projects (Equinor, 2020), and on producing, transporting,
and injection CO2 in EOR projects, demonstrates that there is
little difference in the reservoir characterization, wells drilled,
facilities design, or operations required to safely inject CO2 into
the ground. This is the case even if saline aquifers or deep rock
mineralization is used for storage. The cost structure of CCS
operations is going to be similar to gas injection facilities and
wells that are used for secondary or tertiary oil and gas recovery
techniques in the OGI [IEA (International Energy Agency), 2013;
Irlam, 2017].
The main difference between producing oil and gas and
storing CO2 is the direction of flow and that the reservoir
pressure is higher at the end of the project rather than depleted.
It requires the same skills, technology, and safety ethos. The
storage reservoirs have to be found, wells drilled, and facilities
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and pipelines built. Once the CO2 has been injected into the
reservoir, monitoring to check for leaks is required, and any
remediation work undertaken. As the reservoir pressure is higher
at the end of storage than the beginning, continuous monitoring
of the reservoir integrity is required as unlike a depleted oil and
gas reservoir, the pressure in the storage structure may not be
balanced by the natural hydrostatic head in the rock formations
above. The scale of the work to be undertaken will be of a similar
magnitude to the current OGI work undertaken to find and
produce oil and gas at the current rates (Pershad et al., 2012;
Spence et al., 2014). The question remains: who will form this
CCS industry? The OGI is an obvious starting point, but to ramp
up an industry of such a magnitude would mean doubling the
size of the OGI resources of personnel and investment from the
level today. This would require a large investment in training
of geoscientists and engineers for the industry which today, due
to the “great crew change” (see below) and the cyclic nature of
employment in the industry, struggles to find enough suitable
qualified personnel. It would also require a huge investment in
Geology and Geophysics surveys and infrastructure building. In
the current economic climate, the big question is who pays for
the investment needed to kick start this industry and how can it
be made fairly as part of a wider transition to sustainable living
in a post-Covid-19 context (Lippponen et al., 2017; Allen et al.,
2020).
The Cyclical Nature of the OGI
In the past 50 years, the OGI has been very cyclical due to rapid
changes in the oil price. These changes are driven by supply and
demand and perturbed by interruption in supply due to wars,
civil unrest, changes in demand due to boom and bust cycles in
the world economy, and political intervention to modify supply
and thereby prices and disrupting technologies such as horizontal
wells and fracking. Most oil and gas demand is satisfied by the
long term or future contracts, the price of which changes slowly,
and historically many gas contract prices are closely pegged to the
oil price. However, the remainder is traded on the spot market,
which defines the price of Brent and West Texas Intermediate
crude oil, the Henry hub spot gas price in the USA, and the
spot price of liquefied natural gas (LNG). These spot prices
are volatile and very sensitive to the supply-demand balance.
Even in an ideal world without any perturbation from policy or
conflict, high growth in the world economy leads to an increase
in consumption of energy, which tightens the margin between
supply and demand, and oil and gas prices increase. As the prices
go up, small- and intermediate-sized independent oil companies
start to increase exploration and development (E&P) activity,
followed by the majors, which increases the supply of oil and gas.
However, as the high oil prices in turn lead to a slowdown in the
world economy, the demand slackens, the spot price of oil and
gas drops, and E&P activity slows. The OGI cycle, which tends to
last around 5–7 years, repeats itself and tends to be out of phase
with the boom and bust cycles of the world economy.
National oil companies, especially those in OPEC, and the
majors with large portfolios of producing fields and exploration
licenses, tend to modify their activity selectively in response
to low oil prices and focus on lower-risk and lower-cost
interventions, and low-risk exploration prospects to reduce
overall costs and take a long-term view of the cycles. However,
small- and medium-sized independents, who rely on cash flow to
fund E&P activity, cut spending fast. The US Baker-Hughes rig
count reflects this fluctuation in activity and has ranged between
287 and 4,500 active drilling rigs from 1975 to present (Baker-
Hughes, 2020). Such drastic changes in E&P activity result in
service and drilling companies releasing many skilled people, and
they also stop hiring and reduce their training programs. This
in turn, affects the prospects for graduate earth scientists and
engineers, and University course intake on such courses is also
cyclical. Many of the people released in a downturn do not return
to the OGI as they find other jobs in the world economy, which is
out of phase and hiring when E&P activity is low. This has led to
a bimodal distribution in the age of skilled E&P workers and led
to “the great crew change around 2000.”
As generally the world economy is out of phase with the oil
industry and consumes more energy when hydrocarbon prices
are low (and OGI activity low), it also emits more CO2. As an
example, the Covid-19 pandemic has currently curtailed global
economic activity and oil prices have fallen as a result and rig
activity is the lowest since 1972 (Baker-Hughes, 2020). This
means that oil and gas supply will lag demand if and when the
economy recovers and emissions will pick up (Le Quéré et al.,
2020). If there was a parallel CCS activity, which was part of the
OGI, then the reduced resources required in the E&P part of
the business could be reassigned to the CCS one and somewhat
reduce the see-saw in activities.
Potential Business Model
As oil and gas companies are to be involved in the creation of the
CCS industry, the potential business model should be designed
with due regard to the upstream oil and gas industry. The cost of
producing oil and gas can be divided into operating costs (OPEX)
and amortized capital costs (CAPEX). The CAPEX includes the
cost of buying the license to explore and produce hydrocarbons,
exploration costs, reservoir characterization costs, and the cost of
building the infrastructure including drilling the wells, acquiring
well and geological data, and constructing pipelines, platforms,
and pads and processing equipment. CAPEX is amortized over a
fixed period that not only depends on the license agreements and
tax regime of the country but is also related to the size of the field
and can be from 3 to 30 years. In addition, under some license
agreements, provision has to be made for decommissioning of
facilities, either in the form of a levy, an escrowed provision, or
taxation. OPEX relate to the ongoing operation of the producing
facilities and includes repair andmaintenance, energy, personnel,
well-health checks and well work-over, oil and gas transportation,
marketing costs, and water disposal costs. The sum of the OPEX
and amortized CAPEX divided by the production volume gives
the lifting costs per barrel of oil (bbl). Typically, in the UK
continental Shelf (UKCS), it ranges from $23 to $84/bbl (HM
Revenue Customs, 2018). Profit before tax is the difference
between the sales price and lifting costs. In the UKCS, the current
tax rate is between 30 and 40% of the profit (HM Revenue
Customs, 2018), depending on the license agreement. With the
recent volatility in oil prices from $140/bbl in 2009 to $14/bbl
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in 2020, it is easy to understand changes in E&P activity in the
UKCS, where many projects are producing oil at a loss at low
prices for a period of time that could destroy the profitability
of the overall project over its lifetime. This leads to caution in
investing in new projects, raising the bar to exclude riskier high
potential lifting cost projects. This is, in turn, can reduce the total
oil and gas that will be produced in an area or country.
CCS OPEX and CAPEX include many of the components
pertaining to E&P activity. Well-site and offshore oil and gas
processing is replaced by injection compressors, injector well-
completion tends to be simpler than producing wells, the
metallurgy of the infrastructure is required to be CO2 corrosion
resistant, and there would have to be some monitoring of
posterity for the safety of the storage facilities/reservoir, which
is somewhat similar to the needs of nuclear waste disposal sites.
The cost metric would be storage cost in $ t/CO2. The total
cost of CCS would be the gas separation cost at the point of
emissions plus the transportation and storage cost plus amark-up
for profit. Cost will be sensitive to distance between capture plant
and geological storage and the depth of the geological formation.
The section of the transport pipeline system on land will be more
costly per kilometer due to the complex planning systems (CCS
Cost Reduction Task Force, 2015).
The UK government’s study of levelized electricity costs (UK
Government - BEIS, 2016, 2020) per MWh for new generating
capacity commissioned in 2030 would be as follows: First of a
Kind (FOAK) combined cycle gas turbine generation with CCS
(CCGT-CCS) ∼$120/MWh, reducing to $108 for an Nth of a
Kind (NOAK) by 2040. This is competitive with the current UK
strike price of new nuclear ($124/MWh for Hinkley Point) and
offshore wind (which ranges from $75 to $232.5/MWh) (UK
Government – BEIS, 2019). Currently, a UK coal-fired power
station emits between 750 and 900 kg CO2/MWh. This makes
the cost of transporting and storing CO2 around $79.5/MWCO2.
The CCGT emits about half the CO2 per kilowatt-hour and hence
the cost is∼40/t CO2. In comparison, BP estimated that in Salah
CCS land site, the separation, transportation, and storage cost
was $10/t CO2 in 2000; however, the ongoing monitoring costs
were not included. US DOE (Department of Energy), (2015)
estimates a FOAK cost of adding CCS to a super-critical thermal
power unit to be $124–133/MWh and an NOAK for $108/MWh.
This gives a cost of avoided CO2 of $74–83/t CO2 for FOAK
and $55 for an NOAK. They further gave estimates of the cost of
avoided CO2 for other industries for different counties depending
on the access to geological storage. For countries with access
to land storage, like the USA, this cost per ton of CO2-avoided
emission is as follows: iron and steel, $77; cement, $124; fertilizer,
$26; and biomass to ethanol, $22.
Most of these costs for avoided emissions are < $80/ton of
CO2, with cement being the most expensive. This is equivalent
to the current carbon tax paid in the Norwegian Sector of the
N sea, which includes the EU ETS. These carbon values have
been used in Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) to evaluate
the Socio Economic Pathways (SSPs) to achieve Representative
atmospheric GHGConcentration pathways (RCP) to limit global
temperature rise to 2◦C (RCP 2.6) and 1.5◦C (RCP 1.8). All
the models show that large quantities of CCS are required to
reduce ongoing emissions and both afforestation and BECCS are
required to remove 10Gt of CO2/year to achieve net zero by 2050.
This highlights the urgent need to start the CCS industry and get
on top of the technology, in order to ramp up to the scale required
by 2050. $80/t means that in 2050, the new global CCS industry
will have an annual turnover of $3 trillion, using the IEA emission
figures of 37 GT CO2e/year. The question is how does society pay
for the storage.
BEHAVIORAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLICY
CHANGES TO KICK START CCS
A wide array of behavioral and policy changes are required to
drive the technological measures needed to limit the increase in
global mean temperature to 2◦C or the Paris aspiration of 1.5◦C
above preindustrial levels. The recent IPCC report on Global
Warming of 1.5◦C demonstrated the large increase in risk to the
earth’s ecosystem services for an increase in warming from 1.5 to
2◦C which may have a larger cost than the $3 trillion annual CCS
cost (Allen M. R. et al., 2018; Rogelj et al., 2018), so CCS needs
to be kick started quickly to fully decarbonize energy use and
provide infrastructure for GGR BECCS and DAC storage as well.
Energy Use Systems and Economic
Changes to Achieve Net Zero
Existing and affordable technologies such as nuclear, geothermal,
wind, solar, bioenergy, and tidal electricity generation and heat
provision are available to substantially reduce greenhouse gas
emissions (Edenhofer et al., 2014). Their large-scale adoption
will require a large investment in new infrastructure. Many
studies, such as IEA [BP, 2020; IEA (International Energy
Agency), 2020a] predict the continuing need to use fossil fuels
to meet the growing demand for energy in order to achieve the
socioeconomic objectives and sustainability goals in the global
economy. If fossil fuels continue to be used, then combustion
products cannot be released to the atmosphere. If they are, then
in order to limit warming to 2◦C, McGlade and Ekins (2015)
suggest that 82% of coal reserves, 49% of gas, and 33% of oil will
have to be left unburnt in the ground. Pragmatically, the only
way that the world energy needs, predicted by the IEA-defined
policy scenario, can be satisfied up to and beyond 2050 and at
the same time reduce GHG emissions, is to capture and store
carbon dioxide resulting from the fossil fuel burn in geological
repositories (CCS).
It is clear that fossil fuel use for energy generationwithout CCS
needs to be phased out [Edenhofer et al., 2014; Allen M. et al.,
2018; IEA (International Energy Agency), 2020a] Combined
energy-economic-climate modeling suggests that to achieve
climate mitigation goals, annual investment flows for extraction
of fossil fuels and fossil fuel power plants without CCS would
need to decline, with increased investment flows into energy
efficiency, power plants with CCS, and other modes of energy
generation including renewables and nuclear (Edenhofer et al.,
2014). This presents the oil and gas industry with some significant
challenges, but CCS provides a significant opportunity, as many
of the skills required for oil and gas extraction for energy are
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those required to locate suitable geological locations for CO2
storage and to move the CO2 from the point of generation to
the long-term geological storage. In addition, the use of CO2 for
tertiary recovery is an established technology used in producing
oil, and this provides symbiosis between the CCS and the fossil
fuel production industries.
The same teams drilling wells for fossil fuel extraction in 2019
may be drilling wells for CCS in 2030. This may also smooth
out the OGI boom and bust cycles. Furthermore, hydrocarbons
are valuable commodities that provide a range of products other
than energy and will be extracted for these purposes even if the
hydrocarbons are not burned for energy generation; however,
there must be an incentive to start the transition.
Public Perception and Cost to Society
Currently, the public’s perception of climate change is that
“something needs to done” and the high media profile of
a Swedish teenager Greta Thunberg and the galvanism of
organizations like Extinction Rebellion and Greenpeace have
created a sense of urgency about “doing something.” However,
the world economic system is wedded to continuous growth
which is driven by consumers in all parts of the world wanting a
leveling up of their economic situation and having food security,
housing, health provision, and other aspects of higher standards
of living. The concept of polluter pays is lost in the fear of having
to actually change consumption habits or having higher prices
for energy use. In addition, the millennium goals aim for an
equitable standard of living for all humans and human nature
interprets this as leveling up. Politicians are wary of changing
policies about houses, energy use, and transportation that curtail
growth for fear of reducing disposable income and not being
re-elected. As a result, it is easy for NGOs and political parties
to blame large corporations who produce the energy, materials,
manufactured product, and food and demand they decarbonize
so people can continue with their consumerism. The fossil fuel
industry is demonized because it provides the fossil fuel for the
economy to run when in fact, the oil and gas industry holds all
the skills, expertise, capital, and assets that have the ability to
decarbonize energy use. If “big bad oil” steps up to the plate to
kick start the CCS industry, it will transform its image into the
“savior of the climate” and avoid having its shares divested by
well-meaning organizations.
Government Policies
At the government level, energy security and climate change
mitigation targets are often poorly aligned and policy is
contradictory. At the industry level, there is limited engagement
from the oil and gas industry with the climate change dialog,
but where such engagement has occurred, the outcomes have
been extremely useful. More dialog between large energy
corporations and those interested in limiting climate change
(including governments, environmental NGOs, academia, and
wider society) can only help to build trust between the various
stakeholder groups and to find a common ground for shared
action. Taking the UK as an example, over the last decade, there
have been several research and engineering projects that have
been funded by the UK government and the EU to develop
CCS technology up to funding front-end engineering designs
(FEED). However, these stopped short of providing funding
for building pilot commercial CCS–equipped power stations.
In addition, using several fiscal levers has been introduced to
decarbonize electricity generation. The first is essentially a tax
on carbon emissions which adds cost to fossil fuel generation
to augment. The second type is to encourage investment in low
carbon generation. These are renewable obligation certificates
(RoCs) up to 2005 for large-scale power stations and latterly Feed
in Tariffs (FITs) for small-scale heat and electricity generation.
More recently, the Contracts for Difference (CfD) to subsidize
low carbon electricity/heat production has been introduced. The
added cost or these schemes are actually passed on to the energy
consumer though their consumption billing. In this scheme,
power generators have to bid at CfD auctions which are the
lowest price to be paid. In 2020, CCGT-CCS was added to the
eligible low carbon technologies. These policy levers have resulted
in lowering the carbon intensity of UK electricity from ∼850
CO2e/kW in 1990 to an average of 241 in 2019 but had not yet
encouraged commercial CCS to start.
ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS
Several actions are recommended to spur the development of
a CCS industry. These include push and pull incentives by
governments, oil and gas industry transition to zero carbon,
and changes to regulations relating to the abandonment of oil
and gas wells and the decommissioning of offshore platforms
and pipelines.
Push and Pull Incentives by Governments
Currently (2020), the following six countries have set legally
binding net zero GHG emission targets: the UK, Sweden,
Norway, France, Denmark, and New Zealand and are setting
carbon budgets (CBs) for future decades to ensure the transition
to net zero. These CBs should be made legally binding. The
UK for example has met all carbon budgets to date, set by
the Committee for Climate Change (CCC), a UK government
advisory body. Meeting these targets reduced total GHG
emissions by 43% from 1990, mainly from energy provision,
changing from coal- to gas-fired CCGT, and increasing the
proportion of renewable energy to ∼30%. CCGT now generates
∼40% and as it provides most of the dispatchable power to cover
for the intermittency of renewables, it will still be required in the
future to 2040, unless sufficient large-scale electricity storage is
developed tomeet this demand. Thus, it requires decarbonization
with CCS. In addition, CCS is required to decarbonize metal,
chemical, and cement industrial processes as well as for GGR
using BECCS andDACS. It is imperative that there is government
financial support for, or investment in, the FOAK CCS plant in
the UK for both power and industry. The first contracts for CfD
for the early CCGT-CCS systems could also be a mechanism to
support early CCS introduction. In addition, a licensing scheme,
similar to that for O&G exploration should be put in place for
CO2 storage, and a mechanism for the long-term (centuries)
responsibility for the storage should be put in place to transfer
the liability to the government at some point in time.
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In addition, a mechanism is required to promote carbon
trading to replace the EU ETS scheme. The scheme in Norway
uses EU ETS and has an additional carbon tax on top that brings
the total CO2 cost to ∼$80 a ton which is close to the estimated
CCS carbon cost for Snøhvit (Energy Facts Norway, 2020). So,
in order to create a supply chain for CCS and incentivize, its use
such as carbon price in the UK would provide a carrot for the oil
and gas industry to get involved in the business and also a stick
to encourage industrial and power-generating companies to store
their emissions. This means that the carbon tax and CCS cost
need to be aligned; this would create a mechanism for the CCS
industry to be economically viable. In addition, an evolutionary
carbon balance approach was proposed by Zakkour et al. (2020),
whereby fossil fuel resource holders manage outflows and inflows
of carbon in the geosphere and create and maintain the market
for geological CO2 storage.
If the principle of “polluter (consumer or end user) pays”
is applied, then carbon cost or the cost of carbon storage is
added to the service, energy, or commodity being purchased.
This inevitably will result in an addition to the cost of living
and be inflationary. To avoid inequities, the government should
facilitate investment in energy efficiency across all sectors. The
housing sector should have improved new building insulation
standards and also regulations to improve the energy efficiency
of existing commercial and domestic housing and building stock.
New housing developments should be organized around self-
contained communities that include schools, health facilities,
shops, and work places that can be accessed by active transport
such as walking and cycling. The need for commuting should be
reduced by improving Internet connectivity with fiber networks
to enable home or local hub working locally. Investment in
electrifying public transport should be prioritized over cars as
electrifying all modes of transport with the current mix of bus,
train, and car will considerably increase the need for low carbon
electricity. Thus, with less electricity required per capita, the cost
of living increase can be constrained.
Industry Transition to Net Zero
In those countries that have net zero emission targets, the
upstream oil and gas industries will have to make a transition to
low carbon energy and are currently committed to eliminating
operating GHG emissions. In general, these companies see the
responsibility for eliminating GHG emissions from their product
use as being further down the supply chain.
A report by SNC-Lavalin’s Atkins Business called Engineering
Net Zero (Atkins, 2020) quantified the challenge of moving to
net zero while maintaining economic and social progress in the
next 30 years. It identified that to decarbonize building, heating
and transport of all kinds would require a massive investment
on both electricity and hydrogen (H2) production. Renewable
electricity from tidal, wind, and solar would increase, but as it
is intermittent, it requires dispatchable power source such as
CCGT-CCS, or large-scale storage, which can be quickly switched
on, with nuclear providing a base load and black start capability.
H2 would be used for decarbonizing transport using fuel cell
technology for HGVs, buses, trains, and possibly aircraft that
cannot be easily electrified. These issues are emphasized in the
Committee on Climate Change (2019). H2 will also be required
for industrial process and building heat using the gas grid. H2 can
be made through electrolysis of excess renewable electricity, but
the majority will be made by steam-reformingmethane and using
CCS. This provides a great boost in procurement of capital goods
for all sectors of industry and energy transition for traditional
O&G companies.
From this, it can be seen that most end uses for fossil fuels
will require CCS so if companies that produce the oil, gas,
and even coal also store the resulting carbon from their use,
they will become carbon-neutral companies. An alternative for
this is a viable carbon trading system that ensures net zero to
the atmosphere. All the skills and technology for well-drilling
and engineering, reservoir management, structure pipelines, and
processing currently resides in the oil and gas industry so this
transition could be seamless. O&G companies will morph into
O&G and CCS companies.
In the UK, there are green shoots for the CCS and BECCS
industry with a group of industrial companies in the planning
stages of a CO2 collection system in the Humber and Tyne valley
regions. There is also a BECCS pilot plant, funded by the UK
government and DRAX company, that is proving that CO2 can
be captured from the exhaust gasses of a large biomass burning
power station. In NE Scotland, there is a pilot steam methane-
reforming plant being built, funded by the UK government
and EU, and located in the St. Fergus gas terminal. This is
managed by the Pale Blue Dot Company with Shell providing
the CO2 transport and storage in their depleted Goldeneye gas
field, which had been decommissioned. For other European
countries, Equinor, Shell, and Total have formed an alliance to
plan for an EU wide CO2 collection scheme to dispose of CO2
in the Norwegian sector of the N Sea building on their Sleipner
experience. In the US and Canada the infrastructure exists for
CO2 transportation for large scale tertiary recovery schemes and
in reality it just takes investment or tax breaks [e.g., Section 45Q
tax credits for CCS (Congressional Research Services, 2020)] to
expand this to CCS. From this, it can be seen that the sleeping
giant of the oil and gas industry is awakening to the net zero era.
Implications for Decommissioning
Oil and gas facilities and reservoirs are currently being
decommissioned without regard for the carbon cost of doing
so, both in terms of the potential reuse of the assets and actual
deconstruction costs. In addition, wells are being plugged and
abandoned with the well-sealing system being designed for
the current status, reservoir fluids in place and the reservoir
pressure, which is usually depleted. No regard is made of the
potential reuse of the structures and reservoirs for CO2 storage,
which will usually mean repressuring the reservoir to its initial
preproduction pressure. If the well-plugging does not consider
potential re-pressurizing with CO2 then that reservoir will not be
able to be used for CCS. The structure will have the weakness of
the abandoned wells, not designed for CO2 containment, which
will be very difficult to remediate after the well-head is cut below
the mudline. Due to the large future requirement for CCS, all
well-abandonments should be designed with this in mind and
government regulation relating to this needs to change.
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Using Carbon Dioxide as a Feedstock for
Manufacturing Low Carbon Products
The future potential to use the separated or stored carbon dioxide
as a feedstock for low carbon products is an area attracting
research. We have previously mentioned the combination of
CO2 with magnesium-rich brine to produce a cement that
can be used to manufacture lightweight building material, thus
storing the carbon. There are other mineralization pathways
that can be used. Crop growing productivity can be enhanced
by growing crops in an atmosphere with elevated CO2 level
as is currently done in many greenhouses; this is known as
CO2 fertilization. Finally, there is research into the production
of synthetic and fuels and plastics from CO2 plus energy
from renewables. Stored CO2 has the potential to have an
intrinsic value.
CONCLUSIONS
It is clear that CCS is technically feasible and that in order to
achieve both net zero and the requirements for more energy
production, this industry must be up and running at a large scale
by 2050. At present, electricity generation using CCGT-CCS is
estimated to be of comparable cost with nuclear and renewables
so its use will not adversely impact millennium goals. Only the
petroleum industry has the skills to start up and maintain this
huge CCS industry. If it grasps this opportunity, its image will be
transformed from climate pariah to global savior. The wheel of
change appears to be starting to turn.
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